Credit Union Capital, Insolvency, and Mergers Before and After Share Insurance by WILCOX, James A
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title













Credit Union Capital, Insolvency, and Mergers 
Before and After Share Insurance 
 
 
Stephanie O. Crofton 
High Point University 
 
Luis G. Dopico1 
Filene Research Institute 
 
James A. Wilcox 




From their beginnings in 1908, U.S. credit unions have grown into a trillion-dollar 
industry with more than 100 million members. Despite many similarities, credit unions have 
always differed fundamentally from banks. One fundamental difference was that share accounts 
in credit unions, unlike bank deposits, were not debt. Thus, credit unions had options to delay 
and discount payments to account holders. Those options were one reason why, when thousands 
of banks failed, no credit unions failed during the Great Depression. Insolvency came to credit 
unions only after share accounts became federally insured in 1971. 
 
Insurance and its associated regulations had larger effects on the structure of the credit 
union industry than it had on the banking industry. Insurance turned bank deposits from risky 
debt into riskless debt. Insurance largely turned credit union share accounts from risky equity 
into riskless debt. Thus, insurance introduced insolvency risk and insolvency to credit unions. 
 
Before federal insurance, many credit unions voluntarily liquidated, and of those, only 
about one-fifth imposed losses on their members. After federal insurance took effect in 1971, 
voluntary liquidations of solvent credit unions became rare.  
 
To reduce insolvency risk and losses to the share insurance fund, regulators enabled and 
encouraged mergers of both strong and weak credit unions. They also discouraged new credit 
unions. These regulatory responses moved the credit union industry from high entry and low 
merger rates to near-zero entry and high merger rates.  
 
We further argue that the proximate causes of regulation differed between credit unions and 
banks. Major bank regulations almost always, and only, happened following banking crises. In 
contrast, major credit union regulations rarely followed crises, but rather usually followed 
prosperity in the credit union industry. Insurance is one of the examples we give.  
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: lgdopico@gmail.com 
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I. Introduction and Overview 
For decades, credit unions have been an important component of consumer finance. 
Credit unions first appeared in the United States in 1908. They began by providing savings 
vehicles and consumer loans, typically to workers with modest incomes. The credit union 
industry grew moderately during its first two decades. Then came the Great Depression. While 
thousands of banks failed in the early 1930s, credit unions suffered less and none failed.  
To boost confidence and reduce risks in banks, starting in 1934, accounts at banks—but 
not at credit unions—received federal insurance. Nevertheless, from the early 1930s through the 
early 1940s, the number of banks stagnated and the number of credit unions more than tripled. 
By the mid-1950s, there were more credit unions than banks. When federal insurance came at 
last to credit unions in 1971, credit unions numbered well over twenty thousand. Over the 
decades, credit unions garnered larger and larger, but still quite small, fractions of the markets 
for consumer savings and consumer loans. By 2000, for example, credit unions had seven 
percent as many assets as banks, but 18 percent as many consumer loans as banks. Nonetheless, 
having over 100 million members and over $1 trillion of assets testifies that members value their 
credit unions (NCUA 2018a). 
Credit unions have always differed fundamentally from banks. While the wide-ranging 
financial deregulations since the 1970s swept away many differences between credit unions and 
banks, there are still substantive differences in incentives, performance, and regulation. 
Credit union regulations changed at different times and for different reasons than bank 
regulations. Since the early 1900s, regulation of credit unions and banks has evolved, sometimes 
gradually adapting to changes in the financial environment, and sometimes with Darwinian 
punctuations. Major changes in banking regulations tended to reflect recent major events, like 
crises. For example, the economic calamity and banking crises of the early 1930s led directly to 
federal insurance for deposits at banks and at thrift institutions, to the separation of commercial 
from investment banking, to the prohibition of interest-bearing checking accounts, and to other, 
seismic shifts. 
In contrast, major changes in credit union regulations typically were not reactions to 
credit union problems. For example, it was not until 1971, decades after the banking crises of the 
early 1930s, that accounts at credit unions became federally insured. At that time, the credit 
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union industry was healthy and growing, and the U.S. economy had enjoyed years of steady 
prosperity.  
Capital requirements provide another example of this pattern. Regulators made banks’ 
capital requirements explicit and higher in the latter 1980s and early 1990s on the heels of 
banking crises. Explicit, higher requirements for credit union capital, however, did not follow 
crises but, rather, flowed from compromise legislation necessitated by a U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling about regulators’ authority. 
To help illuminate the rough, alpine road to current regulations, we recount some 
important features and repercussions of regulations (and laws) that governed credit unions’ 
shares and reserves. We focus on the especially consequential effects of federal share insurance. 
Although federal insurance made credit unions more like banks in some respects, fundamental 
differences remain. 
The introduction of share insurance brought a new risk to credit unions, a risk that banks 
had always faced: insolvency risk. Banks’ deposits were always debt, or fixed liabilities. As a 
result, banks could, and sometimes did, become insolvent and fail. That was true both before and 
after insurance. In contrast, insurance turned credit union shares from largely equity-like into 
largely debt-like. Before insurance, sufficiently large losses in the value of their assets (e.g., 
loans) could mean that credit unions would not be able to pay their shares at par. However, since 
the value of the equity-like shares could fall along with the value of the credit unions’ loans, 
members could suffer losses individually, but the credit unions themselves would not become 
insolvent or “fail.” Members could vote to voluntarily liquidate an unsatisfactory credit union, 
but regulators did not require its liquidation. 
After insurance, credit unions faced with losses in the value of their assets could no 
longer reduce the value of members’ shares. Shares that were once largely equity-like became 
largely debt-like. Large losses in the value of credit union assets would no longer result in 
reductions in the value of members’ shares, but would render the credit unions themselves 
insolvent. If regulators concluded that, in the foreseeable future, individual credit unions would 
bear sufficiently large losses that they could not repay their shares in full, then regulators would 
carry out “involuntary” liquidations (or mergers) of those credit unions. Thus, by protecting the 
value of credit union members’ shares, insurance created a new risk for credit unions: 
insolvency, or failure, risk. 
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We argue that regulators responded with two main offsets to the risks that share insurance 
spawned. First, to reduce the ex-ante probabilities of insolvencies of credit unions, as well as the 
likely ex-post losses to the share insurance fund, regulators imposed higher standards for reserves 
and imposed numerous other rules and requirements. Second, regulators allowed, and even 
advocated, mergers as an exit route for both healthy and troubled credit unions. Urging merging 
resulted in a dearth of voluntary liquidations of credit unions, which had been common before 
share insurance. Having troubled credit unions merge into healthier ones reduced the numbers of 
ex-post failures and thus losses to the insurance fund. To facilitate more mergers, regulators 
liberalized their rules about credit union membership. 
In the same vein, after insurance, regulations took into account that new and small credit 
unions were much more likely to become seriously troubled. The tilt of these regulations made it 
more difficult for these credit unions to continue, or even to get started. The combination of 
eased merger policies and the tilt of regulations led mergers to soar and the numbers of new 
credit unions to plummet. This deregulation and regulation intentionally stifled the beehive of 
entries and exits of credit unions before insurance. When coupled with the greater cost 
efficiencies of larger credit unions, they fueled the industry’s consolidation into vastly fewer, but 
larger, credit unions. 
 
II. Credit Unions Before Insurance 
Patterned after similar institutions in Germany and Canada, the first U.S. credit union 
appeared in 1908 in New Hampshire. Credit unions began as lending clubs that accepted funds 
from members and made short-term loans to their members. Regulation soon followed 
innovation. New Hampshire and Massachusetts (1909), and New York, Wisconsin, and Texas 
(1913) were the first U.S. states to regulate credit unions. Early credit union laws provided a 
cooperative, or democratic, framework to promote saving by those with modest means and to 
provide them loans at low interest rates (Moody and Fite 1984). By 1920, ten states had laws 
specific to credit unions. By 1935, forty-one states did. Rather than recodify the wheel, the credit 
union laws of most states generally followed the template of New York’s 1913 law and, later, a 





Membership and ownership 
Since it passed the Federal Credit Union (FCU) Act in 1934, the U.S. Congress revised it 
occasionally, most recently in 2013. Before the FCU Act, only states chartered credit unions. The 
Act established a federal charter and defined a credit union as a “cooperative association 
organized … for the purpose of promoting thrift among its members and creating a source of 
credit for provident or productive purposes” (U.S. Congress 2013).2 
Members could start, or later join, a credit union by purchasing shares at par (e.g., for 
$10) (Morman 1920; Ham and Robison 1923, 15; Neifeld 1931). Credit unions largely accepted 
funds from and could make loans to only their members. Each credit union’s charter delineated 
its field of membership (FOM). Members needed to be in their credit union’s FOM, which 
reflected a “common bond,” such as the employees of a company, the members of a church or 
other group, or the residents of a specific geographic area, such as a neighborhood. Early on, the 
vast majority of credit unions’ FOMs were associated with employers, members had fewer and 
longer job tenures, and multiple-job households were less prevalent. As a result, households were 
usually in one, if any, FOMs. That is not the case today. Since the early 1980s, the great 
liberalization of FOMs and the increase in the number of employers within each household’s 
lifetime greatly increased the number of FOMs per household. 
Credit union shares bore some similarities and differences compared with those of other 
corporations, such as banks. In (commercial) banks, shareholders own the institutions and have 
votes in elections of directors equal to the number of shares of common stock that they owned. 
Unlike in banks, credit union members had one vote per member in elections for boards of 
directors, regardless of the number of shares owned. Unlike banks, credit unions are exempt 
from both federal and state income taxes. The competitive advantages that flowed from the tax 
exemptions likely play a key role in accounting for the growth of credit unions relative to banks 
over the decades, but they are not particularly germane here. 3 
 
 
                                                 
2 The FCU Act refers to United States Code (U.S.C.) Title 12, §1752. Sections 1752-1795. The analogous national 
charter for banks began in 1863. 
3 Mutual savings banks and mutual savings and loans were somewhat similar to credit unions. Among their 
differences were that those mutuals generally granted members with higher deposit balances more votes in Board of 
Director elections and that they lost their income tax exemptions in the latter 1900s. The biggest distinction was that 
only credit unions had defined FOMs. 
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Shares at risk 
Like bank shares and deposits, credit union shares provided funds for loans. However, 
credit union shares differed consequentially both from corporate (including bank) shares and 
from bank deposits. They also differed from any deposits that credit unions offered. Unlike 
corporate shares, credit union shares could normally be acquired or redeemed at the credit union 
at par (e.g., for $10). Unlike bank deposits, credit union shares were not (defaultable) debt. In 
addition, shares had lower priority than credit union deposits if withdrawals became problematic. 
A template for credit union bylaws specified that “the money on one or more shares may 
be withdrawn … (by a) member” (Parker 1927).4 Being able to withdraw (or redeem) shares at 
par clearly distinguished them from shares of corporate stock. While corporations and owners of 
their shares may sell their shares, corporations are not obligated to buy back their shares, whether 
at a pre-set price or even at a “market” price.  
In addition to shares, some credit unions also offered deposits, which were somewhat 
akin to “preferred shares.” (Deposits were less significant sources of funds to credit unions.) 
Deposits paid pre-set interest rates periodically, for example monthly or quarterly.5 They were 
normally redeemable upon demand at par. Like shares, however, credit union deposits had 
limited rights to withdrawals. The Parker template for credit union bylaws, for example, 
stipulated that deposit “withdrawals shall be honored in the order in which the notice therefor is 
filed (as the funds therefor become available).”6 
The features of credit union deposits highlight some of the risks borne by shares. Rather 
than the pre-set rates promised on credit union deposits, dividends on shares tended to be paid 
annually and tended to vary, for example, with credit union earnings. In addition, deposits had 
higher priority than shares. If withdrawals were problematic, credit unions could not pay any 
share dividends or allow any share withdrawals until they first paid the pre-set interest promised 
on deposits and allowed deposit withdrawals—at par. Having uncertain dividends and lower 
priority, shares were riskier. Presumably reflecting the recognition of greater risk, dividends on 
                                                 
4 Credit Union Bylaws, Article IX: 7 (Parker 1927). 
5 Credit Union Bylaws, Article X: 1. 
6 Credit Union Bylaws, Article X: 4. 
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shares averaged slightly more than interest on credit union deposits (Clark 1944, 61; CUNA 
1975).7  
In normal circumstances, members could withdraw credit union shares on demand and at 
par. The same was true for bank deposits. Before insurance, however, both bank deposits and 
credit union shares were risky: Either might repay at less than par. The important difference was 
that bank deposits were debt and shares were not. The important consequence was that repaying 
at less than par would lead to the closure of banks, but could leave credit unions open. 
A bank that could not redeem deposits on time and at par violated the terms of that debt. 
Regulators would deem that bank to be insolvent and close it. If regulators did not close 
defaulting banks promptly, redeeming at less than par would likely incite a bank run, which 
would quickly exhaust its cash and similarly force the bank to close its doors—and its 
operations.  
In contrast, credit union laws made clear that redeeming shares at less than par violated 
nothing. Unlike bank deposits, credit union shares were designed to absorb losses without 
triggering default or closure. In that regard, credit union shares had some of the attributes of bank 
equity capital and of bank shares. State laws and credit unions’ bylaws explicitly referred to 
credit union shares as capital. New York’s Credit Union Law of 1913 noted “the capital of a 
credit union shall consist of the payments made by members on shares, and unpaid dividends 
credited thereon.”8  
To deal with abnormal circumstances, credit unions had two valuable redemption options 
that banks did not have: to delay and to discount. The Parker (1927) template for credit union 
bylaws allowed a credit union to restrict share withdrawals to the days in which members made 
interest and principal payments. Since loans made by early credit unions had very short 
maturities, interest and principal payments would quickly cover most withdrawal requests.9 The 
bylaws further ordained, “withdrawals shall be paid in the order of their filing and as funds 
                                                 
7 Credit union dividend rates averaged about five percent during the early 1930s (Froman 1935). Four percent was a 
common interest rate on credit union deposits at the time (Parker 1935, 66). 
8 New York’s Credit Union Law of 1913 §450. Throughout, we refer to the New York Credit Union Law of 1913, as 
amended in 1915, that was included in Ham and Robinson (1930). 
9 A sample of 176 credit unions had loan originations of $20.1 million during 1925 and had $13.4 million of loans 
outstanding at the end of 1925, suggesting that the average loan maturity was less than one year (Parker 1927). Ham 
and Robinson’s Credit Union Primer (1930, 24) recommended a maximum maturity for credit union loans of one 
year, while recognizing that some loans would likely be renewed at maturity. 
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therefor become available” (Parker 1927). In addition, they allowed a credit union’s board of 
directors to require at any time that a member give 30 days’ notice before a withdrawal. 
Crucially, if a credit union were in dire straits, due to large loan losses or any other problems, the 
bylaws permitted it to redeem shares at less than par.10, 11 
Further cementing shares’ at-risk status, New York required each credit union to put 
reserves in an account, referred to as the credit union’s “guaranty fund,” that was available to 
absorb losses and thereby reduce risks to the par value of its shares.12 When faced with losses, 
credit unions could tap their guaranty funds to avoid impairments to shares (Parker 1927, 20). 
New York’s Credit Union Law of 1913 required that at least 25 percent of net earnings be 
contributed annually to the guaranty fund “for the protection of shareholders in the event of 
losses” (Bergengren 1935, 26).13 In accordance with the template of the Uniform Credit Union 
Law, most states generally required annual transfers of at least 20 percent of net earnings 
(Neifeld 1931; HLR 1931; Clark 1944, 51). Credit unions used the remainder of net earnings to 
pay year-end dividends, or as additions to their retained earnings beyond their guaranty funds. 
 
“Fail safe” credit unions 
The options to delay and to discount share withdrawals essentially removed liquidity risk 
and solvency risk from credit unions. Delays could stifle runs and discounts could match 
declines in assets, so that net worth was never negative.  
How effective were delay and discounts? Reports during the Great Depression asserted 
that there had been no runs on credit unions (Moody and Fite 1984, 109). The Congressional 
report on the Federal Credit Union Act uncovered no involuntary liquidations of credit unions 
whatsoever during the halcyon years of 1929–1933 (U.S. Senate 1934, 2).14 The contrast with 
banks is stark: Runs on banks were numerous and ruinous. Many thousands, nearly 40 percent in 
all, of banks closed during 1929-1933 (Federal Reserve 1959). Belying crises among credit 
                                                 
10 §459.  
11 Another remedy for members was to transfer (i.e., sell) their shares to another member of the credit union, subject 
to the restrictions and approval of the board of directors, including paying a transfer fee to the credit union (Credit 
Union Bylaws, Article IX: 6).  
12 §457. 
13 §457. Net earnings equaled interest and noninterest income minus noninterest expenses, interest paid on deposits, 
and losses on loans. Unlike today, then dividends paid were not subtracted in the calculation of net earnings. 
14 Of course, voluntary liquidations of credit unions could impose losses on shares.  
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unions, as late as 1936, 94 percent of the credit unions that were in operation in 1929 were still 
operating (Moody and Fite 1984, 202). 
A necessary condition for discounts’ removing solvency risk was that credit unions had 
minimal amounts of liabilities (including debt). In their ordinary courses of business, credit 
unions incurred minor amounts of liabilities, such as accounts payable.15 Their small sizes and 
the potential ramifications for control and ownership if they could not make payments kept credit 
unions away from taking loans or issuing bonds and other debt.  
The option to discount shares, coupled with the near absence of liabilities, reduced the 
risks of a credit union’s insolvency, and thus of failure and of regulators closing institutions 
through “involuntary liquidations,” to essentially zero. Losses might be large enough to wipe out 
reserves in guaranty funds and leave assets worth less than the par value of all shares. However, 
because they were allowed to redeem shares at less than par, credit unions were virtually 
precluded from insolvency.  
Although uninsured credit unions could remained solvent, their losses hurt members. 
Lower, even negative, earnings could reduce or delay dividend payments. Large enough losses 
imposed delays and discounts on share withdrawals. The specter of low or no dividends might 
spur withdrawals (even at discounted values). Dismal prospects might lead members to vote to 
voluntarily liquidate their credit union and absorb losses if the liquidation of its assets did not 
generate enough cash to pay (the few liabilities and deposits and) shares at par. 
Consider a credit union that funded $100,000 of loans with $90,000 from share accounts, 
$5,000 from its guaranty fund (or reserves), and $5,000 in accounts payable. Loan losses of 
$10,000 would wipe out the guaranty fund, but leave $85,000 of assets to support shares (or 
capital or net worth). For this credit union to become insolvent, loan losses would have to exceed 
the sum of (par) balances in share accounts plus the guaranty fund, i.e., on the $100,000 of loans, 
losses would have to be of $95,000. While possible, loan losses of that proportion are extremely 
unlikely. In practice, members would likely vote to voluntarily liquidate this credit union well 
before loan losses cut into asset values that severely, thereby avoiding an insolvency if it could 
not repay the $5,000 of accounts payable.  
                                                 
15 At the end of 2017, for example, aggregate liabilities (other than shares and net worth) at federally-insured credit 
unions equaled four percent of their assets. 
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Credit unions then were analogous to equity mutual funds now: If they do not have 
liabilities, they cannot become insolvent, or “fail.” When they have no fixed liabilities, the net 
worth of such equity mutual funds cannot be negative, regardless of the net worth of the (limited 
liability) corporations whose shares they owned. The obvious contrast is banks, which were 
funded overwhelming with defaultable debt, mostly in the form of short-term deposits.  
Despite large losses, members could continue operating a credit union if they judged that 
it still provided valuable services, or that the values of their shares might rebound. Thus, before 
insurance, regulators rarely pushed credit unions into involuntary liquidation. Indeed, it was not 
until 1946 that the FCU Act provided a procedure for involuntary liquidation of federal credit 
unions (CUNA 1981, vii).  
 
III. Safer Shares Made Credit Unions Riskier 
In this section, we trace out the introduction of federal insurance for (the par value) of 
shares in credit union accounts and some of the regulators’ ensuing reactions. In the next section, 
we show how the reactions led to significant restructuring of the credit union industry. 
By protecting the par value of shares, insurance clearly made shares less risky. Insuring 
shares also stripped credit unions of their insurance against insolvency. Of course, deposits and 
other debts had always imparted insolvency risk to banks. With federal insurance having 
introduced insolvency risk to credit unions, regulators sought to rein it in. One way was 
supervision and regulation that was more rigorous. The second way to contain insolvency risk 
was to tighten capital requirements. From their earliest days, regulations required credit unions to 
set aside a fraction of their earnings as reserves. These regulations did not set minimum ratios of 
capital to assets that had to be achieved but, instead, stipulated flows into retained earnings. As 
an intermediate step to minimum capital ratios, revised regulations required credit unions to set 
aside reserves--unless they achieved a specified capital ratio. By the 2000s, capital regulations 
for credit unions had shifted completely from flow to stock requirements. Regulators required 
credit unions to achieve minimum ratios of their capital to assets.  
To avoid distractions in our discussion of financial regulations and policies (including 
share insurance), we make several simplifying assumptions that seem to us to be reasonable 
approximations. We continue to assume that only shares and retained earnings appear on the 
right hand side of the balance sheets of credit unions. The intention, essence, and effect of the 
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insurance is to cover the overwhelming majority of shares. In practice, adjustments, exceptions, 
and provisions of share insurance have been quite complicated. After insurance, without 
importantly affecting our analysis, we assume that all shares are insured. We also assume that 
regulators close a credit union when its net worth falls below zero.  
 
Introducing insurance 
The numbers and assets of credit unions grew rapidly through the Great Depression and 
the post-WW II period. Their growth rates then throttled back significantly through the 1960s. 
With 10 times as many credit unions and with a larger market share in 1970 than in 1934, slower 
growth of this maturing industry was likely. By then, the industry contended that one 
impediment to its attracting more members and shares was that some consumers (correctly) 
perceived insured bank deposits to be safer than uninsured credit union shares (Moody and Fite 
1984). 
In 1970, the Credit Union Share Insurance Act (CUSIA) required the new, independent, 
federal regulator, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) to establish the National 
Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) (English 1993, Crofton et al. 2010).16 The U.S. 
Senate report that accompanied CUSIA provided reasons to support the CUSIA bill (U.S. Senate 
1970). Among them were that (1) losses to members were concentrated in the smallest credit 
unions, where share balances tended to be small, (2) federal insurance would attract funds for 
loans to underserved areas, and (3) surveys showed that five out of six members believed 
(incorrectly) that their shares were already federally insured. 
 
Introducing insolvency risk 
Insurance introduced insolvency and closure risks to credit unions. Federal share 
insurance eliminated the options to delay and to discount that assured solvency before insurance. 
A condition for members’ shares to be insured was that credit unions redeem both insured and 
uninsured shares on time, and at par. Withdrawals could no longer be delayed. Shares could no 
longer absorb losses. Delays or discounts led rapidly to closure by regulators. Without the option 
to discount shares, loan losses then fell entirely on credit unions’ retained earnings. If losses 
were larger than its retained earnings, a credit union was insolvent and then closed. The 
                                                 
16 Public Law 91-468. 
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insurance fund, the NCUSIF, redeemed shares at par and bore any shortfall of asset value below 
the par value of shares. 
Figure 1 shows the buffer available to absorb losses at credit unions annually for 1910-
2017. The solid blue and the red dotted lines show aggregate credit union capital and retained 
earnings, as percents of total assets. Credit unions issued no common stock and had minimal 
liabilities before insurance began in 1971. Then, their capital, which equaled shares plus retained 
earnings, equaled credit union assets. Having no common stock or liabilities meant that all of 
that capital was available to absorb losses without triggering default or closure before 1971. By 
protecting shares from losses, however, insurance reduced the volume of loss-absorbing shares 
from all to virtually none. From then on, only retained earnings stood between credit unions and 
insolvency, as shown by the solid line from 1971 onward. The dotted line shows that retained 
earnings were always less than seven percent of assets until the 1920s. They then hovered in the 
5-8 percent range for decades, through the early 1990s. With the greater emphasis on capital by 
both credit union and bank regulators, retained earnings have been substantially higher since 
then, in the 9-12 percent range since 1995. 
 
Regulating insolvency risk 
Shifting the risks of losses at credit unions from shares to the share insurance fund shifted 
regulators’ attention. Regulators sought to avoid and minimize failures of credit unions and 
losses to their insurance fund, and to protect their reputations. Regulations did not change as 
deftly as risks.  
Regulators required credit unions to have reserves to buffer losses from the beginning. 
New York’s 1913 credit union law required credit unions to add a fixed percent of their net 
earnings to their guaranty funds each year. Later, the Parker template for credit unions called for 
20 percent of net earnings to flow into credit unions’ guaranty funds.17 The solid line in Figure 2 
shows credit unions’ actual retained earnings (as a percent of total assets). The dotted line shows 
                                                 
17 Over time, credit unions’ terminology has evolved. Today’s “net worth” (or “retained earnings”) were earlier 
subdivided into “guaranty funds” and “undivided profits” and later into “regular reserves” and “other reserves.” 
Earlier credit unions did not differentiate between guaranty funds (to protect credit unions against unforeseen loan 
losses) vs. allowances for loan losses (to protect credit unions against foreseeable loan losses). Later, credit unions 
set up separate “allowances for loan losses.” 
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the analogous buffer at commercial banks, equity capital (which included stock issued as well as 
any retained earnings) annually for 1911-2017.  
As the decades passed, regulations changed to adjust required flows in light of the stock 
of accumulated reserves. Starting in 1949, for example, federal regulators required no transfers 
into reserves if regular reserves exceeded 10 percent of shares.18 Despite that and other 
adjustments through the years that generally permitted fewer reserves, retained earnings (as a 
percent of assets) rose from 5.26 percent in 1952 to 7.85 percent in 1969.  
These requirements were much more binding on some credit unions than on others. In 
general, they especially constrained larger and faster-growing credit unions. To accommodate 
the more successful credit unions, the U.S. Congress (U.S. Senate 1970, 5) then lowered credit 
unions’ required transfers into regular reserves again (Black and Dugger 1981). Later, the 
Depository Institutions Act of 1977 again lowered required transfers into regular reserves.19 
From the 1980s onward, regulators shifted their focus more and more toward the amounts 
of banks’ and credit unions’ capital buffers and away from gross flows into those reserves. The 
U.S. Congress and bank regulators spelled out capital per assets requirements for banks during 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Over the same years, regulators required credit unions to increase 
their capital per assets as much as banks. Rather than through changes in law or regulation, credit 
union regulators relied then on less-quantified, supervisory pressures.  
In 1998, the U.S. Congress enacted the Credit Union Membership Access Act 
(CUMAA). CUMAA completed the shift of reserve requirements from flows to stocks.20 Credit 
unions that were “well capitalized” were subject to lighter regulation. Being “well capitalized” 
generally required that the ratio of a credit union’s net worth (largely retained earnings) to assets 
was at least seven percent. Credit unions with net worth ratios less than six percent were 
categorized as “adequately capitalized,” which prohibited them from acquiring more assets.21 
 
                                                 
18 Public Law 81-376. 
19 Public Law 95-22. 
20 Several studies analyzed regulations and rationales for how much and what kind of credit union capital was, or 
should be, required or allowed by regulations. See, for example, Crofton et al. (2012), Wilcox 2002, 2003, and 2011, 
NASCUS 2005, CUNA 2010, NCUA 2010).  
21 Before CUMAA, credit unions could stop making transfers into their regular reserves if their accumulated 
reserves were at least six percent of risk assets. For a typical credit union, that corresponded to about four percent of 
total assets. Credit unions had not been required to achieve the six percent target. They just had to keep transferring 
five percent of gross income annually into their reserves if they were below the target. 
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Regulatory responses to banking crises and to credit union quiescence 
The environments that preceded many of the major regulatory actions for credit unions 
differed strikingly and intriguingly from those for banks. Major banking legislation very often 
followed economic and especially banking problems. Pairs of banking policies and problems 
include: The Banking Acts during the U.S. Civil War, the Federal Reserve Act following the 
Panic of 1907, the Banking Act of 1933 (including the Glass-Steagall provisions) and the 
Banking Act of 1935 Act during the Great Depression, the string of laws and regulations that 
loosened and then tightened public policies from the late 1970s through the early 1990s due to 
high inflation and interest rates and banking and thrift crises and, most recently, the Dodd-Frank 
Act on the heels of the global financial crisis that started in 2007.  
In contrast, it is harder to tie major changes in laws and regulations about credit unions to 
economy-wide problems. Its relatively small size meant that the credit union industry was 
unlikely to be either the cause or solution to economy-wide problems. Major changes more often 
followed quiescence than crisis in the credit union industry. While banking’s “reactionary” 
regulation responded to, rather than prevented, problems in the industry, problems less often 
preceded policies in the credit union industry.  
Establishing the federal charter for credit unions in 1934 was a crisis response—but it 
was a response primarily to the crises in the banking industry during 1929-1933. Despite its 
appearance, the new federal charter was not really a major reform, in that it differed little from 
most state charters. Nor did other provisions of the enabling law substantially change regulation 
of (pre-existing) state-chartered credit unions. 
The transformative Credit Union Share Insurance Act (CUSIA) of 1970 followed no 
major upheavals in the economy or in credit unions. Unlike the Banking Act of 1933’s creating 
the FDIC in response to the banking crises of the early 1930s, in 1971 the NCUSIF arose during 
quiescent conditions in the healthy and growing credit union industry. Throughout the 1960s, the 
rates of (1) liquidations with losses per FCUs, (2) shares in FCUs liquidating with losses per all 
shares in FCUs, and (3) losses on shares in FCUs liquidating with losses per all shares in FCUs, 
all declined markedly (BFCU 1960-1969a, NCUA 1970). Credit unions were also healthy when 
CUMAA was enacted in 1998. Retained earnings per assets had been rising for several years and 
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losses imposed on the share insurance fund were low and declining (NCUA 2018a; Wilcox 
2005). 22 Nonetheless, at that time, CUMAA imposed new and much higher capital requirements.  
Just as striking are the regulatory dogs that did not bark. When high interest rates and 
unemployment produced a wave of credit union failures during the 1980s, major regulatory 
responses were not directed at the clearly-troubled credit union industry. Similarly, when the 
U.S. Congress started calling for banking regulators to impose new, higher requirements for bank 
capital in the latter 1980s, it could have used the same rationale to apply them to credit unions, 
but it did not. Part of the explanation for that omission likely can be found in credit unions’ 
having weathered the late 1980s and early 1990s far better than banks and thrifts did.23  
 
IV. Entry, Exit, and Mergers After Insurance 
Before insurance, credit unions were typically small, volunteer-driven, and somewhat 
informal. Large numbers of new credit unions formed and large numbers voluntarily liquidated, 
usually without losses imposed on members. 
Insurance changed the relation of credit unions to their regulator. Regulators still 
preferred that the industry expand and prosper. But, now, regulators also sought to minimize 
failures and losses to the insurance fund, and thus to their reputations. 
In this section, we delve into the incentives that insurance brought to federal regulators of 
credit unions, their responses, and to thoroughgoing effects on the structure of the credit union 
industry. After insurance, the risks and rewards, not to credit union members, but to regulators, 
help explain the dramatic declines in entries and voluntary exits of credit unions. Similarly, 




This section begins by presenting our newly-constructed data for credit unions for the era 
before federal insurance. One consequence of share insurance and regulations was that different 
                                                 
22 Public Law 105-219. 
23 Credit unions’ annual provisions for loan losses (and net loan charge offs) per assets were far lower than banks’ 
during 1980-1991 (0.34 percent vs. 0.66 percent) and reached far lower peaks (0.48 percent vs. 1.25 percent) 
(NCUA 2018a; FDIC 2018a). 
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data were collected and different data were relevant. We show the most comparable, available 
measures in Table 1, but recognize difficulties in comparing their magnitudes.  
For instance, liquidations with losses are not directly comparable to failures. One reason 
is that, before insurance, members could and often did continue to operate credit unions that 
could not redeem shares on time and at par. After insurance, however, regulators were expected 
to close insolvent credit unions and could close those expected to become insolvent. In addition, 
regulators averted closures of some troubled, even insolvent, credit unions by coaxing them to 
merge with stronger ones. Only 0.07 percent of federally-chartered credit unions merged 
annually before insurance; after insurance, the merger rate soared to 2.48 percent (NCUA 1970-
2018).  
 
Entries and exits 
Table 1 shows credit union entries, exits, and losses before (1934-1970) and after (1971-
2017) share accounts were covered by federal insurance.24 Entries are newly-formed credit 
unions. Exits included voluntary or involuntary liquidations, and mergers. It shows both losses 
on members’ account balances and losses borne by the share insurance fund, NCUSIF. The two 




Before share insurance, the credit unions entered and exited the industry frequently: More 
than 20,000 federally-chartered credit unions were formed and nearly 6,000 liquidated.26 The 
second row in Table 1 shows that, before insurance, the number of new credit unions formed 
each year averaged over eight percent of the existing credit unions. The same row shows that the 
                                                 
24 We eschewed difference-in-difference calculations with data for credit unions and banks because the industries 
had dramatic differences before and after 1971 in regulation, as well as in insurance. 
25 Data for individual credit unions were only available for years since 1979, long after insurance began. For years 
before 1979, aggregate data for credit unions were available from regulators’ annual reports for a small number of 
variables for federally-chartered credit unions and for far fewer variables for state-chartered credit unions.  
26 For the years before share insurance, we concentrated on federal credit unions (FCUs), because annual data on the 
formation and the liquidation of state-chartered credit unions were less consistently available. The unweighted 
average annual rate of new FCU formations was 41.1 percent during 1934-1970. That rate was misleading. During 
the infancy of the FCU charter, the number of FCUs was, of course, trivially low, which made for extraordinary 
percentage growth rates. There were 78 FCUs in 1934 and 906 in 1935, implying an entry rate of over 1,000 
percent. Therefore, we show an annual rate that was weighted by the numbers of FCUs in operation each year. 
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rate was decimated after insurance, at only 0.83 percent, and lower yet, at 0.06 percent, since 
2000.  
Insurance changed regulatory policy from encouraging to discouraging new credit 
unions. Before share insurance, credit union regulators had goals of boosting the numbers of 
credit unions and of members and boosting the volume of industry assets. It is tempting to 
consider them industry boosters. As one of the more explicit incentives for newly-formed credit 
unions, for example, regulatory personnel could be rewarded for the number of credit unions that 
they helped form.  
Figure 3 shows the large, sudden and continuing decline of new entries to the credit union 
industry after 1970. Smaller and younger credit unions have long liquidated more often (Croteau 
1952; BFCU 1937-1969a). In recognition of those dangers, after insurance, regulators began to 
demand that FCU charter applicants have more credentials and present more-professional 
applications. The more rigorous chartering process effectively stopped formation of new, less-
formal, volunteer-driven credit unions. The annual numbers of new credit unions formed fell 
sharply, from about 1,000 during the 1960s (a 4.64 percent annual rate), to about 500 (2.28 
percent) during the 1970s, and then to about 100 (0.45 percent) during the 1980s. Not shown in 
Figure 3 is the continuing decline in annual formations after 1990, to about 10 (0.09 percent) 
during the 1990s, seven (0.07 percent) during the 2000s, and three (0.04 percent) during 2010-
2017 (Dopico 2014 and NCUA 2018a). 
In contrast to credit unions, formation of new banks continued apace. After about 160 
banks started up annually during the 1960s, about 180 started up annually during the 1970s and 
1980s. Unlike sharply lower entry rates for credit unions, commercial banks’ entry rates did not 
collapse until the global financial crisis. Banks’ entry rates averaged 1.97 percent in the 1980s, 
1.28 percent in the 1990s, and 1.62 percent in the 2000s. Banks’ entry rates then sank after the 
2000s. In 2010-2017, the rate averaged 0.04 percent. This contrast suggests that the dramatic 
decline in new credit unions more likely stemmed from regulatory shifts than from overall 
economic and financial conditions. 
Many of the important changes after 1971 in economic and financial conditions, in 
technology, in demographics, and in some regulations would have had broadly similar effects on 
banks as they had on credit unions. Nonetheless, as Figure 4 shows, the rise and fall of credit 
unions was not mirrored in the path of banks. The number of credit unions climbed steadily 
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while they were uninsured, and then declined steadily, starting suspiciously soon after shares 
became insured. In contrast, the number of banks held quite steady, between 14,000 and 15,000, 
for more than three decades before and more than one decade after 1971. Nor does Figure 4 
shows any upsurge or downturn in the number of banks in operation for any year near 1971. 
Starting in the 1980s, the numbers of each sank, as geographic restrictions on banks and FOM 
restrictions on credit unions eased, thereby permitting more of them to merge (Dopico 2000). 
 
Exits 
While discouraging new credit unions from entering, since the early 1980s regulators 
have pushed for new credit union members and for industry growth by expanding permissible 
fields of membership (FOM). Broader FOMs increase the pool of those eligible to be members 
and simultaneously provide greater geographic and borrower diversification. As the number of 
new credit unions dwindled and regulators and conditions pushed smaller credit unions into 
mergers (Dopico and Wilcox 2009), the rate of voluntary liquidations also plummeted.  
The third row in Table 1 shows that, before insurance, it was quite common for credit 
unions to disband without imposing losses on shares: Each year on average, nearly two percent 
did. Of the nearly 6,000 liquidations, only about 1,000 of them imposed any losses on members’ 
share accounts. Liquidations without losses typically took place due to shrinking memberships or 
an inability to retain paid or volunteer officials. However, far from imposing losses on members, 
those liquidations actually paid liquidating dividends that averaged eight percent of shares 
(Croteau 1952, 200; BFCU 1934-1969a, NCUA 1970). 
After 1971, the comparable rate, for voluntary liquidations, was nowhere near as large: 
Only 0.37 percent annually (see also Figure 5). With regulators’ making mergers feasible and 
members’ benefiting from larger economies of scale, and often as well from becoming part of 
financially stronger credit unions, mergers became common.  
While the comparisons are imperfect, the numbers of credit unions liquidating with losses 
to members before insurance and of failures (with losses to the insurer) since insurance have 
been remarkably similar. Table 1 shows both averaged 0.49 percent during, respectively, 1934-
1970 and 1971-2017. Weighting liquidations and failures by the amounts of shares affected 
better reflects their import to members and/or taxpayers at, respectively, a measly 0.03 percent 
before insurance and 0.10 percent after insurance.  
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Comparing (1) losses to members before insurance with (2) the sum of losses to the share 
insurer plus losses to uninsured shares (hereinafter: total losses) requires care. Before insurance, 
the total dollar amount of losses to members in FCUs was very small. Because nearly all of the 
credit unions that liquidated with losses to members had small amounts of shares, aggregate 
losses were also very small, averaging only 0.003 percent of aggregate FCU shares before share 
insurance (BFCU 1937-1969a, NCUA 1970). At the same time, the percentage losses at the 
relatively few FCUs that imposed losses on their members were often large. As Table 1 shows, 
before insurance, losses per shares in FCUs that liquidated with losses averaged 17.4 percent. 
Loss rates were not much different after insurance. Total losses per shares in credit 
unions that failed declined somewhat to 15.6 percent during 1985-2017.27 At the same time, 
however, the percent of shares in credit unions that failed during 1971-2017 was 0.10 percent. 
That was higher than the 0.03 percent of shares that were in credit unions that liquidated with 
losses before insurance. And, as the bottom row of Table 1 shows, annual total losses averaged 
0.021 percent of shares in all credit unions after insurance, up from 0.003 percent before 
insurance, an increase of a mere two basis points. 
While banks imposed similarly low losses on the FDIC before credit union share 
insurance, they imposed noticeably higher losses on the FDIC after share insurance. Annual 
FDIC insurance losses per insured deposits averaged 0.003 percent during 1934-1970, but rose to 
0.069 percent during 1971-2017 (FDIC 2018b). The increase of seven basis points in the rate of 
losses imposed by banks was considerably larger than the credit union increase of two basis 
points. The relatively modest increase in their loss rate hints that credit unions may not have 
taken much more risk after insurance than they had before insurance. 
 
More mergers  
Share insurance and its regulatory responses transformed the structure of the credit union 
industry. Perhaps the most significant response was in the easing of FOM and merger 
restrictions.  
                                                 
27 Data about insurance losses and assets at individual credit unions before 1985 are either unavailable or unreliable. 
Since the insurer and uninsured shares shared losses pro rata, the loss rates were the same for (1) insurer losses per 
insured shares, as for (2) losses to uninsured shares per uninsured shares, and as for (3) the sum of insurer losses and 
losses to uninsured shares per total shares. 
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Mergers were rare before insurance; they became numerous afterwards. The sixth row in 
Table 1 shows that there were almost no credit union mergers before insurance: Less than one-
tenth of one percent of credit unions merged annually. The sixth row also shows the explosion of 
mergers after insurance: Well over two percent of credit unions merged each year. What had 
been an annual flow of, at most, about two dozen mergers became a tidal wave of hundreds of 
mergers. 
Figure 5 shows liquidation (without losses and voluntary) and merger rates before and 
after share insurance was introduced. After being rather steady during the 1960s, starting about 
the middle of the 1970s and lasting for about a decade, the voluntary liquidation rate trended 
sharply down and the merger rate trended sharply up. Then, for about three decades from the 
middle of the 1980s onward, both plateaued: The liquidation rate fell to nearly zero and stayed 
there; The merger rate soared to around three percent. Below we make the case that this strong 
negative correlation was causation—from more mergers to fewer liquidations. More of a stretch, 
perhaps, would be the argument that the negative correlation between the merger rate and rate of 
forming new credit unions was also causation. 
The merger rate was rapid because regulators were able and members were willing to 
merge credit unions. Although both regulators and members may have preferred mergers to 
liquidations long before insurance, only after insurance did regulators enable and encourage 
mergers. Both regulators and members saw plenty of advantages in mergers. Some advantages 
were particularly strong for weaker credit unions; some advantages would accrue to almost any 
credit union.  
Mergers provided more economies of scale to the members of both the target and the 
surviving credit unions. The benefits of the large economies of scale in credit unions led 
regulators and members to support mergers (Dopico and Wilcox 2009). Mergers also allowed 
members of credit unions that might otherwise have voluntarily liquidated to remain members. 
Mergers also let weaker and even nearly-failed credit unions to become part of larger, stronger 
credit unions. This latter group of mergers reduced the actual and expected costs to the share 
insurance fund.  
A merger typically required enlarging a credit union’s field of membership (FOM). 
Regulators were quite willing to liberalize fields as much as the law permitted, and beyond. 
From the early 1980s, the NCUA had judged that FOMs were too restrictive and, likely, 
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prevented sufficient diversification of credit risks. That was one reason that the NCUA gave for 
permitting FOM expansions. One example of liberalizing membership fields was the NCUA’s 
permitting a credit union to include the employees of several small companies, instead of 
requiring a tiny, separate credit union for each small company (NCUA 1982-1984). Of course, 
the better diversification via liberalized FOMs could have been argued for nearly all credit 
unions, however strong or large. 
Without judging the economic merits of NCUA’s actions, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that FOM expansions exceeded the authority delegated to the NCUA by the U.S. Congress 
(NCUA 1999; CUNA 1999; Wilcox 2011). Faced with the possibility of evicting vast numbers 
of members from their credit unions and being pressed by banks, the U.S. Congress passed 
CUMAA as a compromise. While CUMAA grandfathered previous FOM expansions, it also 
acceded to long-running requests by banks to restrict credit unions. Specifically, CUMAA (1) 
capped most credit unions’ business lending at 12.25 percent of assets, (2) eased the conversions 
of (tax-exempt) credit unions into (income-taxable) mutual thrifts, and (3) set in statute a far-
stricter set of capital requirements.  
 Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor CUMAA stripped the NCUA completely of its FOM 
authority. The NCUA continued, albeit less boldly, to favor FOM expansions and mergers. Its 
continuing authority still allowed NCUA to preside over a vigorous outflow of credit unions, but 
not members, via mergers.  
 
V. Summary and Implications 
Before federal insurance, credit union members’ shares served effectively as loss-
absorbing capital. Funded almost entirely by uninsured shares, whose payments could be delayed 
and discounted, credit unions could avoid the ruinous runs and absorb the losses that caused bank 
failures. As a result, even during the Great Depression and until shares were insured in 1971, 
credit unions did not become insolvent. 
We uncovered very different patterns regulatory changes for credit unions than for banks. 
Major bank regulations almost always, and only, happened following banking crises. Major 
credit union regulations, on the other hand, rarely followed crises. Indeed, they usually followed 
periods of prosperity for the credit union industry. In contrast to deposit insurance’s springing 
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from the banking crises of the early 1930s, share insurance came to a healthy industry and 
prosperous economy. Starting in the 1980s, capital regulations followed the same pattern.  
By requiring that shares be redeemable on time and at par, insurance introduced 
insolvency risk to credit unions. Regulators responded with more regulation of credit unions’ 
activities and capital. They also responded by enabling and encouraging mergers, and 
simultaneously discouraging new credit unions from forming. They encouraged mergers both of 
weak and of strong credit unions. Having restrained entries by new credit unions and having 
stimulated exits via mergers, regulators spurred consolidation of the credit union industry into 
many fewer, much larger credit unions. In future work, we plan to explore how much (or little) 
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Credit union retained earnings and capital 
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Credit union retained earnings and commercial bank equity capital 
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Sources: BLS (1930-1953), BFCU (1937-1969a and b), SSA (1954-1964), Federal Reserve 
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Credit union entries, exits, and losses before and after federal share insurance 
 
Before Share Insurance 
(1934-1970) 
After Share Insurance 
(1971-2017) 
2,450  23,687 Number of CUs 23,267  5,800 
 
Entries 
8.17 New FCUs (% of FCUs) New CUs (% of CUs) 0.83 (2000-2017: 0.06) 
 
Exits 
1.98 Liquidations without losses (% of FCUs) 
Voluntary liquidations  
(% of CUs) 
0.37 
(2010-2017: 0.10) 
0.49 Liquidations with losses (% of FCUs)  Failures (% of FICUs) 0.49 
0.03  Liquidations with losses  (% of FCUs, weighted by shares) 
Failures (% of FICUs,  
weighted by shares) 0.10* 
0.07  Mergers (% of FCUs) Mergers (% of CUs) 2.48 
 
Losses on Shares and to the NCUSIF 
17.4 Losses on FCU shares  (% of shares in FCUs with losses) 
Losses on uninsured shares and 
imposed on NCUSIF 
(% of shares in failed FICUs) 
15.6* 
0.003 Losses on FCU shares  (% of shares in all FCUs)  
Losses on uninsured shares and 
imposed on NCUSIF 
(% of shares in all FICUs) 
0.021 
 
Sources: CUNA (2018), BFCU (1937-1969a and b), NCUA (1970-2018; 2018b), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Except for the number of credit unions in the first row, all values in this table are averages of annual percents. 
CU stands for all credit unions, FCU for federally-chartered credit unions, and FICU for federally-insured credit 
unions. In the years after 1971, nearly all credit unions became insured (FICUs). By the middle of the 1980s, about 
90 percent were insured; by the early 1990s, about 98 percent were insured. 
 
*Data availability restricted the calculation period to 1985-2017 for failures as a percent of FICUs (weighted by 
shares) and for losses imposed on uninsured shares and the NCUSIF as a percent of shares in failed FICUs. 
 
 
 
 
